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The Third Impeachment Article: Congressional Bootstrapping
by William Van Alstyne

Just how elastic a congressional bootstrap is the
impeachment clause? When Congress failed even
to ask the courts to sustain its views of its own
powers against those of the presidency, could it
nevertheless presume to impeach the president
for resisting its claim? The question was raised by
the third article of impeachment voted against former
President Nixon by the House Judiciary Committee.

JN ITS THIRD article of impeachment voted

in late
July, the House Judiciary Committee recited its several subpoenas that former President Nixon "willfully
disobeyed" and concluded that he thereby committed an
impeachable "high crime" or "misdemeanor" because he
had, under claim of executive privilege, '·interposed the
powers of the presidency against the lawful subpoenas
of the House of Representatives." In an editorial on July
31 the New York Times entered a judgment in agreement with the twenty-one-to-seventeen majority of the
Judiciary Committee, concluding that it was "to forestall such a situation that the Founding Fathers wrote
impeachment into the Constitution."' I believe that the
committee and the Times -were mistaken and that had
the issue gone to trial in the Senate, history would have
repeated itself.
In 1868 Pres. Andrew Johnson knowingly violated an
act of Congress, the Tenure of Office Act, which Congress also presumed to determine for itself was constitutional, and accordingly the House of Representatives
impeached the president for his willful defiance of that
law. Yet, as Benjamin Curtis, former associate justice,
observed in defense of Andrew Johnson, it was far from
clear as to who was right, Congress or president, in respect to the contested constitutionality of that law.
The president, believing that Congress had no authority to restrict his power to remove a cabinet officer, in
this instance Secretary of War Stanton, as he, the president, should alone see fit to do, had acted in accordance
with his belief. Johnson thereby precipitated a "case or
controversy" the courts might have determined against
him had Stanton filed suit to regain his office, and Johnson would have been bound to yield to the authority
of the courts to decide. Congress, however, believing the

law to be valid but unwilling to have that determined in
court, presumed to find the president mistaken in his
own opinion and appeared bent on construing the impeachment power as a proper means of granting Congress the right to prefer its own view of the Constitution
to any different view the president might maintain.
Curtis argued passionately before the Senate that
plainly the impeachment clause did not license Congress
to adjudicate its own claims against those of the president, for that would mean that the constitutional powers
of the president would always be only what Congress
itself would be willing to admit. Rather, referring to
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison,
he observed that it was "emphatically the province and
duty of the judiciary to say what the law is," once issue
was joined in a proper case by the willingrress of one
party or another to act upon his own belief and thereby
to bring himself within judicial jeopardy, should the
other party wish to press the matter.
It is not clear, of course, whether it was this argument
that resulted in Andrew Johnson's acquittal in the Senate
by a single vote, but this much is clear: there is no
precedent or authority whatever, and most certainly no
hint of suggestion in any of the original debates accompanying the proposal of the impeachment clause in
1787 or its ratification in 1789, that it was meant to
repose the power in Congress to determine with finality
the extent of its own power when in conflict with a
claim of power by the president. The wrongfulness of
allowing Congress to bring within the ambit of impeachment-"treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors"-a good faith assertion by the president
explicitly disputing in a straightforwanl way the constitutionality of a claimed congressional power should be
apparent to anyone.
Tt is quite true that Mr. Nixon had previously asserted
claims of presidential authority that many (myself included) believed to be without constitutional merit. He
did so in authorizing wiretaps without benefit of judicial
warrant, on grounds of his own prerogative as president,
solely in the interest of "domestic security." He did so
in presuming to impound funds that Congress had directed to be spent. He did so in declining to honor the
subpoena of the special prosecutor for sixty-four additional tapes the special prosecutor deemed essential
evidence in specific criminal trials.
But in none of these instances was Mr. Nixon impeached. In each a party adversely affected by the presi-
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dent's action directly challenged his authority through
the courts, asking only that the judiciary do its duty "to
say what the law is." In each the challenging party succeeded. In each President Nixon yielded to judicial order, as he did after the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Nixon, 94 S.Ct. 3090 ( 197 4).
We have no reason to suppose that he would have
done otherwise had the House Judiciary Committee
similarly sought to press its own subpoenas successfully
in court. The fact that the former president declined to
test his own claim by appealing to the judiciary to sustain him cannot excuse the committee's making the
same choice. The reluctance of each to initiate a litigative test against the other is certainly no high crime or
misdemeanor.
A Great Deal Is a Matter of Inference
Necessarily, for it is scarcely ever otherwise in more
ordinary criminal cases, a great deal is ultimately a matter of inference. It was, as one member of the committee
observed, the arduous process of working with bits and
pieces of a mosaic, arranging them with no bias or favor
but as conscientiously as one can in the context of time
and place, being willing, however, to face up to whatever image one may be compelled to recognize.
But all this is perfectly obvious, except insofar as it
tends to explain and to provide reason for the sheer
breadth of the evidence the' committee would have been
entitled to have considered in support of its charge. Acts
in themselves readily explainable by a wide variety of ·
motives may lose their presumption of innocence when
juxtapo5ed with many other acts. And the inexplicable
and continued refusal of President Nixon to assist the
Judiciary Committee in its authorized inquiry was not
equally inexplicable in the totality of circumstances.
Among these circumstances was not merely the balance
of the evidence which tended in some measure to associate Mr. Nixon in the complicities of concealment
but also the remarkable attachment he had to the items
subpoenaed by the committee and withheld under claim
of executive privilege.
Merits of President's Claim Vanished
It was not only that it "looked bad" to the public, but
it looked even worse to the constitutional lawyer. The
merits of the president's claim were not only thin in the
overwhelming view of those who wrote professionally
about the subject, but it was difficult to believe that they
were honestly felt by counsel whose advice the president
may (or may not) have sought. As poor as they appeared in June, they shrank to the vanishing point following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Nixon. The Court appropriately disavowed any expression about any case other than the one it had to decide,
but it requires no extravagances of analogical reasoning
to appreciate the manner in which the Court's decision
further diminished the little credibility the merits of the
Nixon claim may have had against the impeachment
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discovery powers of the House.
With appropriate caution, the committee was entitled
to consider the circumstances of the president's claim as
they might bear on overcoming the presumption of good
faith and innocence. The manner in which this "absolute" claim was asserted against the Judiciary Committee, the circumstances of assertion, and the persistence
of assertion in the face of every other development
(including the Supreme Court decision) rendered it an
additional datum in the over-all assessment of obstruction of the due administration of justice. It was entirely
appropriate for Representative Daniels to move to
amend tl1e proposed first arlick of irnpeadunent tu include resistance to committee processes a<> one of the
modes according to which it was alleged that the president participated in the obstruction of justice.
This treatment of the claim of absolute executive
privilege, however, would have imposed a different burden on the House managers in a Senate trial than the
utter nonburden they would have under the third proposed article. Under the first article, the managers would
have assumed the burden of satisfying the Senate that
the claim of absolute executive privilege was not made
or persisted in in good faith. Rather, they would have
undertaken to show that, taking everything into account,
the making or continuation of the claim itself was but
an additional means of coverup.
They may have failed, of course, but that is the risk
the impeachment clause requires in order that the president not be removed except for "high crimes" or "misdemeanors." Almost certainly the impeachment trial of
Andrew Johnson would have failed by a far wider margin than it did had the House managers been made to
show that Johnson's claim of right to remove a cabinet
officer without approval by the Senate, contrary to the
Tenure of Office Act, was not a good faith assertion of
his belief that the Tenure Act was itself unconstitutional,
but rather that it was a disguise to conceal or to cover
up some reprehensible acts of his own or of others.
Third Article Was Constitutionally Unsound
Because the Nixon third article of impeachment plied
a wholly diffe.rent theory, however-that the claim of
executive privilege is per se a "high crime" or "misdemeanor" when opposed by a House committee subpoena issued pursuant to the impeachment power-it
was constitutionally unsound.
There is another possible defense to the third article
that might have been raised. It would go like this. After
we have argued up one side and down the other, isn't
it plain enough, even to lawyers (most of all to lawyers?), that the president's claim of privilege against the
impeachment subpoena power was so utterly absurd on
its face that, even had the president himself "really"
believed in it, there could have been no lasting harm in
impeaching him anyway. After all, the precedent
that might have been set would itself be such a little
one, in fact so slight a precedent that we would all be
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ready to distinguish it in almost every other situation.
All that it would mean is that when virtually everyone
is in agreement that a president's claim of constitutional
privilege is manifestly in error, even though honestly
held, he can be impeached and removed. It would be
all right, wouldn't it, if we also all agreed that it was
clearly in the national interest to do so?
Question of Justiciability Has Not Been Tested

Several persons who supported tho third article of
impeachment, trusting to the very eminent authority of
constitutional scholars, attempted to distinguish the issue in Andrew Johnson's case. In their opinion, had
either President Nixon or the committee gone to court,
even to the Supreme Court, the court would have declined outright "to say what the law is," that is, to determine whether the House subpoena power pursuant
to the impeachment clause is superior to· any claim,
much less a blanket claim, of executive privilege. They
say the court instead would have characterized the dispute as "nonjusticiable," a purely political controversy
that the federal courts either are not empowered to decide at all or, if technically within the judicial power as
a "case or controversy" arising under the "laws" or the
"Constitution" as described in Article HI, at least one
highly inappropriate for decision.
This opinion has a great deal to be said for itself. It
is true and importantly so, however, that the Supreme
Court has in fact never passed on the justiciability of
the impeachment subpoena power. Thus, it is nothing
more than an informed opinion that we deal with here,
as the question of justiciability has itself not been tested.
Judicial Determination of Distinction Is Missing
What, then, does the proposition amount to? Essentially, simply this: that whenever Congress persuades
itself that the courts would decline to pass on a constitutional question in issue between itself and the president
of the United States, Congress may then presume to
resolve the issue in its own favor and to impeach the
president for the "high crime or misdemeanor" of holding a different view. r do not see how this really distinguishes Andrew Johnson's case or Benjamin Curtis's
concern at all.
What is obviously missing is precisely the. judicial
determination of the distinction being relied on. If the
House Judiciary Committee had sought to enforce its
subpoenas through the courts, and if the courts had then
declared that it was a matter for the House itself to
decide (as it might, by a holding that the language in
Article I, that the House "shall have the sole Power of
Impeachment," somehow means that the House shall
also be the sole judge of its subpoena power when used
in an impeachment inquiry), that would have settled the
matter. The judiciary having done its duty "to say what
the law is"-that according to the law of the Constitution the House is made the final judge of its own impeachment subpoena powers-the House would not be
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wrong to act, and to impvach the president if he still
continued to defy its process.
But assume that the courts did even less than this.
Assume, rather, that the Supreme Court held only the
question was "nonjusticiable" in the true sense of meaning only that the courts would not themselves presume
to say anything at all about it, rather than holding as a
matter of law that it was a question which the Constitution had committed to the sole determination of the
House. That too would make a difference, because' it
would make clear that the House would have no choice
except to make up its own mind because the judiciary,
for whate.ver reason, declined "to say what the law is."
But neither of these happened. The Judiciary Committee, rather than seeking to determine whether the
courts would decide the issue, presumed to decide for
itself the "nonjusticiability" of the constitutional question. This device readily lends itself to an infinite regress.
What other questions of constitutional conflict might
Congress simply declare to be "nonjusticiable" and by
so declaring use its impeachment power to have its way,
deciding every question in its own favor and threatening impeachment of those who "defy" what Congress
alone has declared to be the "the law"? We come back
to the same point. Neither the constitutionality of the
House impeachment subpoena power nor even the justiciability of the question was adjudicated when opposed
by a claim of executive privilege. Assuming only that the
claim of privilege were asserted in good but mistaken
faith, how can the mere obstinacy of assertion safely or
fairly be described as a "high crime" or "misdemeanor"?
There is but one way in which this could have been
done-indeed, it was done in the first article of impeachment voted against former President Nixon. In
fact, it was precisely because the first article treated this
issue in an entirely proper way that the third article was
so clearly improper.
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The first article alleged, as a "high crime" or "misdemeanor," a course of conduct by the president to impede, delay, interlere with, and obstruct the due administration of justice. There is no serious question whatever
that this charge was well within the core of the impeachment clause. Insofar as the committee was not
obstructed by Mr. Nixon's extraordinary claims of absolute executive privilege, the committee had developed
a substantial case. Most of that case involved cumulative
evidence reviewed by the committee over a period of
several months, briefly profiled in the week of televised
hearings, and ultimately drawn from the thirty-eight volumes of material the Judiciary Committee had already
published.
Some of the material was soft and circumstantial;
some direct and damning. All of it warranted the committee's fair consideration, however, precisely because
much of the basic charge went not only to what President Nixon knew or should have known by even the
moot minimal reasonable superintendence of his moot
intimate subordinates, but why he did or failed to do a
great number of things.
Just how far are we willing to carry this fetish that
Congress ought not to presume to be the sole judge of
just what is an impeachable offense? What if, to use an
example found in the original Watergate hearings, President Nixon personally ordered the, ransacking of Dr.
Fielding's office or even the murder of Dr. Fielding, but
did so claiming that he thought "national security" required it? Should one contend that unless Congress were
to find that the president was not acting in good faith,
that is, in the good faith belief that he did have the
constitutional authority even to direct homicide for rcasons of national security, it could not impeach and
remove him---or at least not do so unless some cou.rt
first declared that the question of privilege was "nonjusticiable"?
Dubious Premises Furnished False Support
But this last example mistakes the whole purpose of
this essay. I have not attempted to argue that only the
courts can presume to say what is a "high crime" or
"misdemeanor." Rather, I assume that of course Congress may determine this to its own satisfaction, and in
moot instances no one would even consider asking the
courts to review the sufficiency of the grounds, even
assuming that any court would agree to do so. Indeed,
I raise no criticism of the other articles of impeachment
precisely because I do not think anyone could seriously
doubt that they alleged "high crimes" or "misdemeanors"
or that conviction and removal on the grounds stated in
those articles would set a bad precedent.
But the third article was objectionable precisely be-.
cause is was not like the other two. May one not finally
test the proposition this way? Suppose that the third
article were made to stand by itself by removing the
support it derived from the other articles. This is not
an unfair way of examining it, as we understand that
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conviction in the Senate vn any article would have resulted in the president's removal and that proof of this
"offense" was already clear-the president did fail to
comply with the subpoenas-where sufficient proof on
the other two articles was more doubtful.
How, then, shall we rationalize the outcome? That
"just like" executively directed homicide under a good
faith claim of constitutional privilege, it was so abundantly clear that default on the committee's subpoenas
even under a good faith claim of constitutional privilege
was so obviously culpable, so plainly corrupt, so unarguably a "high crime" or "misdemeanor" that we
would see no harm done by this construction of the
Constitution?
May someone not inquire, at least at some future date,
that if Congress were so confident of its premises why,
at least, did it not first attempt to remove the doubt by
a willingness to test the strength or even the justiciability of its subpoena power against that claim of privilege
through the judicial process? Would it, truly, have diminished Congress in the public's view, or might not that
willingness on Congress's part have been exactly what
was demanded in the era that was Watergate?
The first two articles of impeachment were powerlul
and correct. They needed 110 false support from the
highly dubious premises of the third. .A.

Cost Accounting Standards Workshop

THE Section of Public Contract Law and the National

Contract Management Association are cosponsoring
a two-day workshop on cost accounting standards whicl:
will be held at the Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D.C.,
on Thursday and Friday, October 31 and November 1,
1974.
The, first morning will feature a number of prominent
speakers. After lunch, the registrants will be divided
into groups of twenty to twenty-five participants. Each
group will have a moderator and a panel consisting of
a member of the cost accounting standards board staff,
a government contract auditor, and a government contracts representative. An attempt will be made to organize the groups to accommodate different degrees of involvement with the cost accounting standards. Discussion
will focus on practical solutions to everyday problem~.
The second morning will continue the group discussions. After lunch selected panelists will summarize the
main issues discussed in the groups, and a questionanswer session will follow.
Further information may be obtained from the Division of Legal Practice and Education, American Bar
Association, 1155 East Sixtieth Street, Chicago, Illinois
6063 7, or the National Contract Management Association, 2001 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia 22202.

